An Introduction to Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade
ESTRICTIONS on international trade, primarily in the form of non-tariff barriers, have multiplied rapidly in the 1980s.' The Japanese, for example, began restricting automobile exports to the United States in 1981. One year later, the U.S. government, as part of its ongoing intervention in the sugar market, imposed quotas on sugar imports.
The increasing use of protectionist trade policies raises national as well as international issues. As many observers have noted, international trade restrictions generally have costly national consequences.
5 The net benefits received by protected domestic producers (that is, benefits reduced by lobbying costs) tend to be outweighed by the losses associated with excessive production and restricted consumption of the protected goods. Protectionist trade policies also cause foreign adjustments in production and consumption that risks retaliation by the affected country.
As a type of protectionist policy, non-tariff barriers produce the general consequences identified above; however, there are numerous reasons, besides their proliferation, to focus attention solely on non-tariff barriers!' Non-tariff barriers encompass a wide range of specific measures, many of whose effects are not easily measured. For example, the effects of a government procurement process that is biased toward domestic producers are difficult to quantify. In addition, many non-tariff barriers discriminate among a country's trading partners.
This discrimination violates the most-favorednation principle, a cornerstone of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the multinational agreement governing international trade. Not only does the most-favored-nation 'See Page (1987) for a general discussion indicating that the proliferation of trade restrictions in recent years has taken the form of non-tariff, as opposed to tariff, barriers. A recent Congressional Budget Office study (1987) notes that the average tariff rate for most developed countries is less than 5 percent. There is no evidence of rising tariff rates or coverage. For example, U.S. tariff revenue as a percentage of total imports has changed very little between 1975 (3.9%) and 1986 (3.6%) , See the Statistical principle require that a country treat its trading partners identically, but it also requires that trade barrier reductions negotiated on a bilateral basis be extended to all GAT'I' members. By substituting bilateral, discriminatory agreements for multilateral approaches to trade negotiations and dispute settlement, countries raise doubts about the long-run viability of GATT. This paper provides an introduction to nontariff barriers. We begin by identifying numerous non-tariff barriers and document their proliferation. We then use supply and demand analysis to identify the general effects of two frequently used non-tariff barriers: quotas and voluntary export restraints. Next, we consider why non-tariff barriers are used instead of tariffs. A brief history of GATT's attempts to counteract the expansion of non-tariff barriers completes the body of the paper.
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS: TYPES AND USE
A tariff is a tax imposed on foreign goods as they enter a country; non-tariff barriers, on the other hand, are non-tax measures imposed by governments to favor domestic over foreign suppliers. Non-tariff barriers encompass a wide range of measures. Some have relatively unimportant trade effects. For example, packaging and labeling requirements can impede trade, but usually only marginally. Other non-tariff measures such as quotas, voluntary export restraints, trade restraints under the Multifiber Arrangement, non-automatic import authorizations and variable import levies have much more significant effects.~These "hard-core" nontariff measures are designed to reduce imports and, thereby, benefit domestic producers. The discussion below focuses on these hard-core barriers.
Quotas
A quota is simply a maximum limitation, specified in either value or physical units, on imports of a product for a given period. It is enforced through licenses issued to either importers or exporters and may be applied to imports from specific countries or from all foreign countries generally. Two examples illustrate these different characteristics. The United States imposes a general quota on dried milk imports; licenses are granted to certain U.S. trading companies, who are allowed to import a maximum quantity of dried milk based on their previous imports. In a different situation U.S. sugar imports are limited by a quota that specifies the shares of individual countries; the right to sell sugar to the United States is given directly to the governments of these countries.
Voluntary Export Restraints and the Multjfiber Arrangement
Voluntary export restraints, which are nearly identical to quotas, are agreements between an exporting and an importing country limiting the maximum amount of exports in either value or quantity terms to be sold within a given period. Characterizing these restraints as "voluntary" is somewhat misleading because they are frequently designed to prevent official protective measures by the importing country. In the 1980s, for example, exports by the Japanese automobile industry to the United States and the United Kingdom have been limited "voluntarily" to prevent the governments of these countries from directly limiting imports of Japanese autos.
An example of a voluntary export restraint on a much broader scale is the Multifiber Arrangement. Originally signed in 1974 as a temporary exception to CA'T'T and renewed three times since, the Multifiber Arrangement allows for special rules to govern trade in textiles and apparel. Under this agm'eement, quotas are set on most imports of textiles and apparel by developed countries from developing countries, while imports of textiles and apparel from other developed countm'ies except Japan are not subject to any restrictions. Multilateral voluntary export restraint agreements are frequently called "orderly marketing agreements." are two general categories of non-automatic licensing.
Discretionary licensing, often called liberal licensing, occurs when an importer's government must approve a specific import; however, precise conditions to ensure approval are not specified. Frequently, this form of licensing is used to administer quantitative limits. Under the current restraints on U.S. imports of steel, a domestic user can request authorization to exceed the maximum import limitation if the specific product is unavailable domestically at a reasonable cost. Exactly how availability and cost considerations affect the probability of an approval are left to the discretion of the authorities.
The second category of non-automatic import licensing requires the importer to meet specific conditions, such as minimum export performance, the use of the imported good for a specific purpose or required purchases of domestic products. In an export-import linkage scheme, a firm's value of imported components is limited to a maximum percentage of the value of its exports. 'rhis measure is intended to improve a country's trade balance and protect domestic producers of components. The Use and Expansion of i\T 00
Tariff Barriers
In a current study, Laird and Yeats (forthcoming) measure the share of a country's imports subject to hard-core non-tariff barriers. Because countries frequently impose non-tariff barriers on the imports of a specific good from a specific country, but not on imports of the same good from another country, they disaggregated each country's imports by both product and country of origin to permit calculation of the total value of a country's imports subject to non-tariff barriers. Each country's "coverage ratio" is simply the value of imports subject to non-tariff barriers divided by the total value of imports.' Table 1 shows the trade coverage ratio for 10 European Community and six other industrial countries for 1981 and 1986. In computing this ratio, the 1981 and 1986 non-tariff measures are apphed to a constant 1981 trade base. 'rhus, the figures identify changes in the use, but not the intensity, of specific non-tariff measures, while holding constant the effects of trade changes. 'See Herander and Thomas (1986) for a theoretical demonstration that an export-import linkage scheme might not improve a country's trade balance. 'Variable import levies, which are actually variable tariffs, are considered non-tariff barriers in this study for two reasons. First, the international trade literature generally characterizes variable import levies as non-tariff barriers. See Nogues et al. (1986) for another list of non-tariff barriers that includes variable import levies. Second, Laird and Yeats (forthcoming) provide the most up-to-date data on non-tariff barriers and we have no way to remove variable import levies from their data. 'The numerical example is from Coughlin and Carraro (1988) .
'One weakness of the coverage ratio as a measure of protectionism is that more-restrictive non-tariff barriers tend to receive a lower weight in the construction of the coverage ratio than less-restrictive ones. For example, a non-tariff barrier that eliminated all imports of a good from a country would have a smaller impact on the coverage ratio than a less-restrictive measure. Assume that one country's imports are valued at $100, $15 of which comes from country A, and there are no non-tariff barriers. In this case, the coverage ratio is zero. Suppose that a non-tariff barrier is now imposed on imports of goods from country A. In the first case, assume that imports from country A decline from $15 to $10; alternatively, suppose that imports decline from $15 to zero. The non-tariff barrier in the second case is more restrictive; however, the change in the coverage ratio does not reflect this fact. The coverage ratio becomes 10.5 percent ($10/$95) in the first case and zero percent ($01585) in the second. Thus, the "intensity" of the protection provided by non-tariff barriers is not measured accurately by this coverage ratio. An alternative measure focusing on the share of trade "affected" by nontariff barriers, which also highlights the proliferation of non-tariff barriers, can be found in Laird and Yeats (1989 Laird and Yeats provide evidence that exports from developing countries to industrial countries are affected to a larger extent than trade among industrial countries. For example, the 1981 trade coverage ratio was 18.8 percent for developing country exports to industrial countries and 14.3 percent for intra-industria~coun-try trade. A similar pattern prevailed in 1986 with a coverage ratio of 20.6 percent for developing country exports to industrial countries and 17.5 percent for intra-industrial country trade.b0 Table 2 contains coverage ratio data on a product basis. As a result of the Multifiber Arrangement, trade in textiles and clothing is subject to non-tariff barriers. For example, slightly more than one-third of European Community and U.S. imports of textiles are affected, while approximately two-thirds of European Community and three-quarters of U.S. imports of clothing are affected. Since these goods are among the most impot'tant manufactured exports from developing countries, coverage ratios for imports from developing countries relative to industrial countries tend to be higher. The agricultural coverage ratios frequently exceed 70 percent; see, for example, the U.S. ratios for sugar and honey (91.9 percent), dairy products (87.8 percent) and oil seeds and nuts (74 percent). Even higher agricultural coverage '°Whiiethis differential may reflect discrimination directed at developing countries, another interpretation is that the differential is product-based. Chow and Kellman (1988) , for example, show that the relatively higher tariff rates faced by developing countries can be explained by product characteristics. ratios are found for the European Community and Japan.
Another dimension of the use of non-tariff barriers concerns differences in the use of specific barriers across countries. Comparisons of the specific measures across countries indicate that voluntary export restraints were used more extensively by the United States than by other countries. By 1986, 11.3 percent of U.S. imports were affected by voluntary export restraints; Greece, with 9.2 percent, had the next-highest share of its imports affected by these restraints.
SUPPLY AND DEMAND ANALYSIS USING QUOTAS AND VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS
Although the quantitative effects of non-tariff barriers are not always easily identified and measured, a theoretical identification of their major effects can be derived using supply and demand analysis. We begin by examining the effects of a quota, then discuss how a voluntary expori restraint can be analyzed similarly.
In figure 1 , lID represents the U.S. import demand curve for some good produced by U.S. and foreign producers. The foreign supply curve (that is, the supply curve for imports into the United States) for the good is SS. With free trade, the United States will import QF units of the good and pay a price per unit of~F- Figure 1 The Price and Quantity Effects of a Quota and a Voluntary Export Restraint Price PQ Now, suppose that an import quota of Qq is imposed by the United States. This restriction causes the import supply curve to become vertical at the restricted quantity. Thus, the import supply curve is the kinked curve SCS'. The restriction reduces the quantity of imports from°, F to Qq~the domestic price to rise from P 8 to PQ and the foreign price to decline from P 8 to PJ3." The higher domestic price reduces total U.S. consumption of the good, but increases U.S. production; thus, U.S. producers of the good benefit at the expense of U.S. consumers in general. The difference between what domestic and foreign consumers pay, 8 B~Qĩs a premium per unit of imports that can be appropriated by exporters, importers or government. The method used to allocate import licenses determines the distribution of these premiums among the potential claimants.
A voluntary export restraint has the same general effects as an equivalent quota. A volun-' 1 Figure I can also be used to illustrate a variable import levy. While a quota limits the quantity ot imports, a variable import levy is used to fix the price. Assuming a target (domestic) price of PQ, when world prices fall below this price, the levy will be altered automatically to maintain the price of P 0 . Thus, no matter how far world prices decline, the quantity of imports will not rise above O~. Consequently, a variable import le'~yand a quota have the same effect, even though they are implemented differently. ' 2 Theoretical research on the impact ot non-tariff barriers has explored various issues that we do not mention in the tary export restraint reduces the quantity of imports, which, in turn, causes the domestic price to rise and the foreign price to fall as shown in figure 1 . Again, the higher domestic price benefits U.S. producers of this good at the expense of U.S. consumers. Finally, the difference between what domestic and foreign consumers pay,
8 B~qĩs a premium per unit of imports that can he captured by exporters, importers or government.
While the supply and demand analysis isolates the major effects of two frequently used nontariff barriers, it conveys virtually no information about either the magnitude of the costs and benefits of non-tariff barriers or their dynamic consequences. ' 2 Various case studies, however, have provided estimates of these costs and benefits. A review of this literature can he found in Laird and Yeats. Two case studies are provided in the shaded inserts on pages and Quantity of as examples of such analyses. The first examImports pIe examines the impact of the U.S. quota on sugar imports; the second examines the effect of the U.S-Japanese agreement to limit Japanese automobile exports to the United States.
As a protectionist policy, non-tariff barriers are a method for redistributing wealth from consumers in general to selected firms and workers. This redistribution is abetted by consumer ignorance and the costs of mobilizing an effective force to counteract protectionist demands. As have demonstrated recently, the benefits received by selected groups of firms and workers are far outweighed by the costs borne by the rest of the population.
WHY USE NON-TARIFF BARRIERS INSTEAD OF TARIFFS?
Since non-tariff barriers have been used increasingly in recent years, an obvious question is why non-tariff harriers rather than tariff bartext, two of which are mentioned below. Since many markets for internationally traded goods are imperfectly competitive, a standard topic in introductory international trade texts is to identify the effect of an import quota in the presence of monopoly. See Krugman and Obstfeld (1988) tor an elementary discussion. Since voluntary export restraints discriminate among trading partners, the effects of this differential treatment have been explored.
See Jones (1984) for such an analysis. 2 ifl early 1985. the Reagar-administration decided that level and ,n 1987 extended Inc restraints for another the domestic auto'nobj!e .ndustry had adjusted to year without a turther increase in the cci'inq. The foreign competition aid announced they wouid nct ask uni~ateratoec-sion to extend the reslra-nts is a c~earn-for an extension Nevertheless in early 1985. the dication mat the Japanese. especi&iy automobile po Japanese governnient exleneed the restraints through ducers. were henefituig from the restrants early 1987 at a level 24 percent above the previous riers have become so popular.' 3 A review by Deardorff (1987) concludes that there currently is no definitive answer to this question; however, numerous reasons have been suggested.
The Impact of GATT: An Institutional Constraint on the Use of Tar jffs
GATT is an institution whose original mission was to restrict the use of tariffs. Given this constraint, policymakers willing to respond to protectionist demands were forced to use non-tariff devices. Thus, in this case, non-tariff barriers are simply a substitute for tariffs. In fact, research by Ray (1981) indicates that non-tariff barriers have been used to reverse the effects of multilateral tariff reductions negotiated under GATT.
14 Certainty of Domestic Benefits Deardorff (1987) suggests that non-tariff barriers are preferred to tariffs because policymakers and demanders of protection believe that the effects of tariffs are less certain. This perception could be due to various reasons, some real and some illusory. For example, it may be much easier to see that a quota of I million limits automobile imports to 1 million than to demonstrate conclusively that a tariff of, say, $300 per car would result in imports of only I million automobiles.
In part, doubts that tariffs will have the desired effect is based on the possibility of actions that could be taken to offset the effects of higher tariffs. For example, the imposition of a tariff may induce the exporting country to subsidize the exporting firms in an attempt to reduce the tariff's effectiveness. The effects of quotas, on the other hand, are not altered by such subsidies.'" Dating from Bhagwati's seminal discussion in 1965, comparisons of the theoretical effects of tariffs and non-tariff barriers have been a frequent topic in the international trade literature. Under various circumstances, a tariff and a specific non-tariff barrier, say, a quota, can cause different final prices and production despite reducing trade by equal amounts. These circumstances produce what is termed nonequivalence. Tariffs and quotas are equivalent when markets are pertectly competitive. In this case, there is no reason to prefer one to the other. Bhagwati (1965 Bhagwati ( , 1968 has demonstrated that the equivalence of tariffs and quotas breaks down in imperfectly competitive markets. Numerous situations can be characterized as imperfectly competitive. To date, however, the literature has provided no compelling reasons for preferring non-tariff over tariff barriers. For a recent example from this literature, see Krishna (1985) . ' 4 A question remains, however, as to why the framers of GATT chose to focus primarily on tariffs rather than nontarift barriers. ' 5 Deardorff's (1987) review provides another perspective on the role of uncertainty. The optimatity of trade policy tools has been explored extensively using trade models with uncertainty. These models, which rely on risk aversion (that is, an individual requires a higher expected return as compensation for an increase in risk) and uncertainty originating outside a country, conclude that quotas are preferred to tariffs. The country is insulated from the uncertainty stemming from randomness in world prices or import supply curves by a quota that stabilizes the price and quantity of imports. One problem with this explanation, however, is that the quota is instituted before the uncertain state of the world is known, while in the real world protection is generally provided after a change in the world market.
Benefits to Other Parties
The supply and demand analysis of quotas and voluntary export restraints highlights the difference per unit of import between what domestic and foreign consumers pay. This price differential reflects the extent of the gains that are available for some group to appropriate. With tariffs) the price differential is captured by the domestic government in the form of tariff revenue. With non-tariff barriers, the domestic government is not a direct beneficiary unless it sells the rights to import to the highest bidders. Otherwise, domestic importers) foreign exporters and foreign governments capture these gains. The potential distribution of these bene fits can influence the domestic government's choice between tariff and non-tariff barriers.
With voluntary export restraints, the price differential identified above is typically captured by the exporting firms from the foreign country. This result may reduce the likelihood that the foreign country will retaliate against such restrictions. Given certain demand conditions in both the U.S. and foreign markets, voluntary export restraints can entail a substantial redistribution from consumers in the importing country to selected producers in the exporting country. For example, Collyns and Dunaway (1987) estimate that the U.S-Japanese voluntary export restraint on automobiles yielded increased benefits to selected Japanese auto producers ranging from $1 billion to $5.25 billion in 1984. Hillman and Ursprung (1988) extend the preceding idea using a simple model of trade policy formulation in which a democratic government is choosing between a tariff and a voluntary export restraint.bO A simplification in this model, whose importance is discussed below, is that rival political candidates place no value on tariff revenue. Assume a voluntary export restraint and a tariff generate identical domestic producer benefits. Politicians will support the voluntary export restraint over the tariff because the voluntary export restraint generates benefits for foreign producers that, in turn, can be appropriated partially by the politicians in the form of campaign contributions. On the other hand, the tariff revenue is assumed to have no value for politicians. Candidates for elective office are viewed as announcing trade policy positions to maximize campaign contributions from domestic and foreign producer interests.
In addition to increasing the probability that protectionism will take the form of voluntary export restraints rather than tariffs, the argument reveals a way that political candidates can personally capture revenues that, with tariffs, would have accrued to the domestic government. Nonetheless, the assumption about the perceived value of tariff revenue to politicians and the fact that consumer interests are ignored in the analysis suggests one should be cautious in generalizing this result.
The possible benefits to domestic politicians of using non-tariff rather than tariff barriers are not restricted to campaign contributions. For example, a tariff is an explicit tax on consumers while a quota is an implicit tax on them. Policymakers might find it easier to support quotas and other non-tariff barriers because they will not be directly associated with a tax increase that consumers, as voters, might resist." l6Husted (1986) also connects foreign lobbying to the domestic economy. He finds that the dollar value of foreign lobbying in the United States is small relative to other traded service flows and that the returns to foreign lobbying generate large returns. For example, Husted calculated that the expenditure in the United States of $1.4 million on foreign lobbying by the world automobile industry came primarily from Japan. Given the estimates by Collyns and Dunaway (1987) and others indicating Japanese automobile rents exceeded $1 billion in 1984, U.S. politicians do not appear to be capturing much of these rents. "A neglected issue in the preceding comparison of nontariff barriers with tariffs is the distribution of these restrictions across industries. While Ray (1981) found that nontariff barriers and tariffs are biased toward industries in which the United States has a comparative disadvantage, he also found some maior differences. Tariffs are biased toward low-skill rather than capital-intensive industries and are unrelated to product heterogeneity and the geographical dispersion of domestic production facilities. On the other hand, non-tariff barriers are biased toward capital-intensive industries producing fairly homogeneous products. Production in these industries tends to be distributed across regions consistent with the distribution of population. The Tokyo Round
GATT AND NON~TARIFF

BARRIERS
The 'Tokyo Round, the most recently completed round lasting from 1973 to 1979, was a comprehensive effort to reduce trade obstacles stemming from tariffs and non-tariff measures. New or reinforced agreements called "codes," were reached on the following non-tariff measures: 1) subsidies and countervailing duties; 2) government procurement; 3) technical standards; 4) import licensing procedures; 5) customs valuation; and 6) anti.dumping,20
The code on subsidies and countervailing duties prohibits direct export subsidies, except under certain situations in agriculture. This code is noteworthy in extending GATT's prohibition of export subsidies to trade in raw matetials. Because nearly all governments subsidize domestic producers to some extent, the code established criteria to distinguish between a domestic and an export subsidy. Domestic subsidies that treat domestic and export activities identically are generally allowed. Countervailing duties, which are tariffs to offset a subsidy received by a foreign exporter, are prohibited unless the subsidized goods are shown to be causing (or threatening) "material" injury to a domestic producer. This code also allows a country to seek redress for cases in which another country's subsidized exports displace its exports in third-country markets.
The code on government procurement states that, for qualifying nonmilitary purchases, governments (including government-controlled entities) must treat foreign and domestic producers alike. In addition to resolving disputes, the code establishes procedures for opening and awarding bids.
The code on technical standards attempts to ensure that technical regulations and product standards such as labeling, safety, pollution and quality requirements do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. 'the code does not specify standards; however, it establishes rules for setting standards and resolving disputes.
The code on import licensing procedures, similar to the code on technical standards, is not spelled out in detail. Generally speaking, governments stated their commitment to simplify the procedures that importers must follow to obtain licenses. Reducing delays in licensing and paperwork are two areas of special interest.
The code on customs valuation established a uniform system of rules to determine the customs value for imported goods. This code uses transaction prices to determine value and is designed to preclude the use of arbitrary values that increase the protective effect of a tariff rate.
Finally, the anti-dumping code prescribes rules for anti-dumping investigations, the imposition of anti-dumping duties and settling disputes.
The standards for determining injury are clarified. This code obligates developed countries to treat developing countries preferentially. Prices, which applied a tariff rate for certain imports to an artificially high dutiable value. The dutiable value was set equal to the price of a competing good produced domestically instead of to the import's actual invoice price. This system was applied to a small portion of total imports, primarily benzenoid chemicals and rubber footwear. Both agreements were blocked by Congress, but were accepted in the next round of negotiations.
'°Non-tariffbarriers were also reduced in civil aircraft and selected agricultural goods, primarily meat and cheese.
The Uruguay Round
The Tokyo Round codes have relied on goodfaith compliance, which has tended to undermine their effectiveness. Streamlining and resolving disputes is a priority during the current round of multilateral negotiations, the Uruguay Round. The Tokyo Round codes will be reviewed and possibly modified during the Uruguay Round. In particular, broadening the government procurement code to include service contracts will be discussed. Concerning the technical standards code, agreements dealing with the mutual acceptance of test data generated by other parties and the openness of the activities of standards bodies will be sought. A major issue in the anti-dumping code is how to handle input dumping (that is, export sales of products that contain inputs purchased at dumped prices).
The Uruguay Round, begun in September 1986, has and will discuss a number of nontariff barrier issues, many of which extend beyond the codes of the Tokyo Round. Trade issues involving agriculture and services (banking, construction, insurance and transportation) are of paramount importance. The United States has proposed the elimination of all trade-and production-distorting agricultural policies. While the major agricultural nations have agreed to the principle of liberalizing agriculture, the sweeping nature of the U.S. proposal has been resisted by some nations, especially the European Community. With respect to services, the primary goal is to establish principles for extending GATT coverage to this trade.
A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office (1987) predicts that the performance of the Uruguay Round will be judged largely on its handling of non-tariff barrier issues. GATT has not effectively combatted rising non-tariff barriers for many reasons. Two reasons are that the effects of non-tariff barriers are less transparent than the effects of tariffs and, in many cases, non-tariff barriers are designed to satisfy a domestic rather than an international objective. A major obstacle is determining at what point a national economic policy, whose international effects are somewhat uncertain, becomes an internationally unacceptable non-tariff barrier. 'I'hese national economic policies have frequently resulted from the lobbying efforts of strong domestic constituencies such as agricultural interests. 'Thus, major trade policy reform will be met with much resistance from these groups.
CONCLUSION
Non-tariff barriers have effects similar to those of tariffs: they increase domestic prices and impede trade to protect selected producers at the expense of domestic consumers. As shown in the case studies of sugar and automobiles, they also have other effects, generally adverse.
Despite the adverse national consequences, the use of non-tariff barriers has increased sharply in recent years. The chances for a reversal of this trend appear to be small. The variety of non-tariff measures, the difficulties of identifying and measuring their effects and the benefits received by specific groups combine to make a significant reduction of non-tariff barriers in the ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations unlikely.
The original mission of GAn, which has been largely achieved, was to reduce tariffs. The question, however, of why policymakers have preferred to use non-tariff barriers rather than tariffs in recent years remains. The more certain protective effects of non-tariff bat-riers is one plausible explanation. A second explanation, which focuses on the distribution of the benefits, is that the benefits of non-tariff barriers can be captured by foreign producers and domestic politicians. Such an allocation of benefits increases the probability that the political process generates larger amounts of non-tariff barriers relative to tariffs. A final explanation is that their adverse effects are generally less obvious to consumers than the effects of tariffs.
